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Texas Supreme Court Limits Default Judgment Victim's Right to
Question and Answer Statement of Facts: Smith v. Smith
A husband appealed from a default judgment granting his wife a divorce,
child custody, and certain property. The official court reporter was not
present at the hearing and thus was unable to furnish a statement of facts. In
addition, the trial judge stated into the record that he had no independent
memory of the facts adduced and would not, therefore, attempt to prepare a
narrative statement of facts. The default judgment was affirmed by the
court of civil appeals,' and the Texas Supreme Court subsequently granted
application for writ of error because the decision conflicted with other
appellate decisions. Held, reversed and remanded: When the court reporter
did not participate in the hearing, and the trial judge states into the record
that he has no independent memory of the facts adduced and will not
attempt to prepare a narrative statement of facts, the invalidity of the
default judgment is disclosed on the face of the record. Smith v. Smith, 544
S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1976).
I.

DEFAULTING PARTY'S RIGHT TO A QUESTION AND ANSWER
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A statement of facts is the part of the record of trial court proceedings in
which the testimony of witnesses is transcribed, and it is ordinarily obtained
in question and answer form from the official court reporter. 2 If the reporter
is not present at the time evidence is admitted, he will be unable to prepare a
complete question and answer statement of facts. In the typical trial, where
both parties appear, courts have dealt with this problem by holding that the
appellant, who needs the statement of facts in order to substantiate his
assignments of error, 3 waives objection to the lack of a proper record by his
failure to request the presence of an official court reporter at the time
evidence is taken. 4 The effect of this waiver is that the appellant is required
to seek a narrative statement of facts by agreement of the parties as provided by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 377.5 If no agreement can be
reached, the trial judge is empowered by rule 377 to settle any differences
6
and certify a proper statement of facts.
I. Smith v. Smith, 535 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976).

2. Until May 27, 1975, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Vernon 1971) provided:

"Each court reporter shall: Attend all sessions of the court; take full shorthand notes of all oral
testimony offered . . . and furnish to any person a transcript of all such evidence or other
proceedings ..
" An amendment to the statute as of the above date added the words "upon
request" so that art. 2324 now provides that the court reporter "shall upon request: Attend all
sessions of the court." Id. (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
3. Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. 1968).
4. Robinson v. Robinson, 487 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. 1972).
5. Id. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 377, quoted in note 6 infra, for the procedures to be followed in
preparing a narrative statement of facts by agreement of the parties.
6. Robinson v. Robinson, 487 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. 1972). The pertinent provisions of
rule 377 are as follows:
(a)

Testimony .

. .

. A party may prepare and file . . . a condensed state-

ment in narrative form of all or part of the testimony and . . . such opposing
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A defaulting party's demand for a question and answer statement of facts
is not so easily dismissed. He cannot reasonably be deemed to have waived
objection to lack of record 7 by his absence since he has a right to have all or
part of the evidence reviewed by an appellate court, and such review
necessitates the existence of a record of the evidence adduced at trial. 8 It
may be necessary to grant a new trial in order to preserve that right of
appeal. 9 The question that Texas courts have struggled with is whether the
default victim must show that he was unable to acquire a statement of facts
either by request of the trial judge or by agreement of the parties in order to
obtain a reversal and a new trial.10 Various courts of civil appeals have
conflicted in their decisions on this issue."
The courts which have held the showing of inability to acquire a record
necessary have not disputed the general rule established by the Texas
Supreme Court in Victory v. Hamilton. 12In Victory the court held that a
litigant's right to have the cause reviewed on appeal can be preserved only
by a retrial of the case "if, through no fault of his own, after the exercise of
due diligence, he is unable to procure such [a question and answer] stateparty, if dissatisfied with the narrative statement, may require the testimony in
question and answer form to be substituted for all or part thereof.
(c) Where a request is made of the official court reporter for the preparation
of a transcript . . . or when, with or without such a request, a statement of facts
is filed or offered for filing by appellant, the appellant shall promptly deliver or
mail to the appellee or his counsel and file with the clerk of the court a designation
in writing of the portions of the evidence desired, and shall specify the portions
desired in narrative form, if any, and the portions desired in question and answer
form, if any, and the portions that are desired to be omitted. Within ten days
thereafter any other party to the appeal may file a designation in writing of any
additional portions of the evidence to be included, specifying the portions desired
in . . . question and answer form, if any.

(d) Approval of the Trial Court unnecessary. It shall be unnecessary for the
statement of facts to be approved by the trial court or judge thereof when agreed
to by the parties. If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses
what occurred in the trial court . . . the matter shall be submitted to and settled
by the trial court or judge thereof and the statement of facts be by him made to
conform to the truth.
7. Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd).
8. Id. A default does not admit allegations of damages unless the claim is "liquidated and
proved by an instrument in writing." TEX. R. Civ. P. 241. If the claim is unliquidated, the court
must "hear evidence as to damages." Tex. R. Civ. P. 243. While there are different types of
default judgments, some requiring proof of damages, others requiring proof of liability and
damages, the distinction is unimportant in the present context. Essentially, the plaintiff is
required to put on some evidence where the claim is not liquidated and proved by an instrument
in writing, and it is such evidence that is subject to the appellate court's review. See also Dugie
v. Dugie, 511 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. Civ App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
9. Victory v. Hamilton, 127 Tex. 203, 91 S.W.2d 697 (1936).
10. Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd).
I1. Some of the decisions that required such a showing are: Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d
571, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ); Parker v. Sabine Valley Lumber
Co., 485 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, no writ); Harris v. Lebow, 363 S.W.2d
184, 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Johnson v. Brown, 218 S.W.2d 317,
322 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Examples of cases that have not
required this showing are: Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 312
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd); Mitchell v. Hunsaker Mfg., Inc., 520 S.W.2d 796
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ); Dugie v. Dugie, 511 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1974, no writ); Waller v. O'Rear, 472 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
12. 127 Tex. 203, 91 S.W.2d 697 (1936).
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ment of facts."' 3 Rather, these courts have used the general rule of Victory
to support their position. Some of them have inferred that a defaulting
defendant who has not attempted to obtain a statement of facts by way of
the procedures provided by rule 377 lacks diligence, 4 while others have said
that such a defendant has failed to demonstrate a genuine inability to obtain
the statement."5
Decisions supporting a contrary view have pointed out several flaws in the
above reasoning. First, they have held that the language of rule 377, which
defines the procedure to be followed by litigants in securing a statement of
facts, presupposes the availability of the court reporter's shorthand notes;
6
the rule should not apply when the court reporter was not present at trial.'
Since rule 377 imposes no duty on a default victim seeking a new trial when
no court reporter was present at the default proceedings, he cannot fairly be
said to be lacking diligence for not attempting to comply with the rule's
provisions. Secondly, the cases have emphasized the unfairness inherent in
requiring the defaulting party to seek a statement of facts from the trial
judge who has already decided the case against him. 17 Finally, these decisions have linked their reasoning to the fact that until recently, when article
2324 was amended, Texas law required that a court reporter be present at all
13. Id. at 209, 91 S.W.2d at 700.
14. Parker v. Sabine Valley Lumber Co., 485 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1972, no writ); Harris v. Lebow, 363 S.W.2d 184, 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
15. Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no
writ); Johnson v. Brown, 218 S.W.2d 317, 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1948, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
16. A detailed analysis of the wording of rule 377 was made by the court of civil appeals in
Waller v. O'Rear, 472 S.W.2d 789, 791, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(emphasis in original):
Now let us look at subsection (d):
'Approval of the Trial Court Unnecessary. It shall be unnecessary for the
statement of facts to be approved by the trial court or judge thereof when agreed
to by the parties. If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses
what occurred in the trial court. . . the matter shall be submitted to and settled by
the trial court or judge thereof and the statement of facts be by him made to
conform to the truth.'
As we view it, the trial court in any of such events does not have the authority
to 'make' a statement of facts; instead his authority is limited to resolving
differences in the record and to make the record conform to the truth.
The court also noted that subsections (a) and (c), which allow use of a narrative statement of
facts, provide the opportunity for a party who disagrees with such narrative statement to
require all or part of the statement to be prepared in question and answer form. It thus seems
clear that the rule does indeed presuppose the existence of a record of the proceedings in
question and answer form, as is provided by a court reporter. This reasoning was followed in
Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1975, writ ref'd), and Mitchell v. Hunsaker Mfg., Inc., 520 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1975, no writ).
17. This problem was discussed by the court of civil appeals in Waller v. O'Rear, 472
S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.):
We have no doubt as to the honesty and integrity of the trial court; however, since
his mind has already been made up in favor of the Defendant-Appellees, it places
an unfair burden upon Appellant to have to rely on the trial court for his statement
of facts. Likewise, in our opinion, to require the Appellant to have to depend
upon the successful parties for an agreement as to a statement of facts is not
calculated to be productive of a statement of facts sufficient for our purposes of
review.
See also Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd).
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court sessions and take notes on all proceedings.18 This was a mandatory
requirement which it was the duty of the trial judge to enforce.' 9 The

obvious inference is that the trial court is at fault if the proceeding has not
been properly recorded, and the defendant should not be penalized for the

court's failure to perform its duty.
The preceding arguments against requiring the defendant to seek an
agreed or narrative statement of facts were employed by the Dallas court of

civil appeals in Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc. 20 Writ of
error having been refused, the case was generally considered to have settled
the issue.2 1 The supreme court, however, appears now to have changed
direction with its decision in Smith v. Smith.
II.

SMITH V. SMITH

In Smith v. Smith the Texas Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
court of civil appeals and remanded for a new trial.22 The Beaumont court of
civil appeals had taken a new approach to the issues involved, and the
decision was harsher to the defendant than in any of the previous cases.
After a discussion of the Victory "due diligence" questions that had occupied most of the judicial opinions on this subject, the court of civil appeals
refused to grant the defaulted husband a new trial even though he showed
that the trial judge had stated into the record that he could not and would not
prepare a narrative fact statement. 23 The court reasoned that since the
defendant would not have been able to obtain reversal by motion for new
trial or by bill of review unless he proved that he was not negligent and had a
meritorious defense to the plaintiff's allegations,
he should not be allowed to
24
obtain such reversal by writ of error.
The supreme court refuted this rationale, citing its decision in McEwen v.
Harrison.25 McEwen held that relief may be obtained by writ of error where
18. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Vernon 1971). For a discussion of this statute see
note 2 supra.
19. Ex parte Thompson, 520 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ);
Dugie v. Dugie, 511 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
20. 525 S.W.2d 312, 314, 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd). Plaintiff ElizabethPerkins, Inc. sued Morgan Express for the value of dresses allegedly lost in shipment. Although
properly served, Morgan Express failed to answer and suffered a default judgment. No court
reporter was present at the proceeding and Morgan Express appealed for a new trial based on
the unavailability of a question and answer statement of facts. The court of civil appeals
granted defendant's motion, and the supreme court refused plaintiff's application for writ of
error.
21. See, e.g., Muldoon v. Musgrave, 545 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no
writ). Where the supreme court refuses application for writ of error it effectively sanctions the
principles of law expounded by the lower court. See Myers v. Gulf Coast Minerals Management
Corp., 361 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1%2); Muldoon v. Musgrave, 545 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ); Continental Oil Co. v. P.P.G. Indus., 504 S.W.2d 616, 620
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. Smith v. Smith, 544 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tex. 1976).
23. Smith v. Smith, 535 S.W.2d 380, 383, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976).
24. Id. at 384. See Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124
(1939), for the requirements to be met by a party seeking to have a default judgment set aside by
way of a timely motion for new trial, and McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706
(1961), for the restrictions encountered by the defaulting party when seeking reversal and new
trial by bill of review. Basically, both require the defaulting party to show that he was not
negligent in suffering the default judgment and that he has a meritorious defense to the
plaintiff's allegations.
25. 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961), cited at 544 S.W.2d at 123.

1174

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

"the invalidity of the judgment is disclosed by the papers on file in the
case." 26 This principle is a generally accepted limitation on the availability
of writ of error. 27 The requirements of a meritorious defense and lack of
negligence do not apply. 28 The holding thus requires the appealing party to
show on the face of the record that the default judgment was invalid. 29 That
does not, however, explain what facts must exist to establish the invalidity
of the default judgment.
There is language to the effect that the appellant is required to show in the
record that he has tried and failed to obtain a narrative statement from the
trial judge. Regarding the trial judge's statement into the record that he
could not and would not prepare a narrative statement of facts, the court
said:
Notwithstanding [that fact], the Court of Civil Appeals ruled that this
showing of Petitioner's inability to obtain a statement of facts did not
entitle him to a reversal of the judgment ....
• . .[W]e rule that Petitioner has established his right to a retrial of
this case because of his inability to procure a statement of facts; that in
such respect the invalidity of the judgment from which he appealed by
writ of error is disclosed by the papers on file in the case ....
The showing of inability referred to by the court specifically included a
statement in the record by the trial judge in which he declined to prepare a
narrative statement of facts. It therefore appears that every such defaulting
defendant will have to seek such a narrative statement from the judge in
order to establish his inability to obtain a statement of facts for use on
appeal. Under this interpretation of Smith, the principle of Morgan Express
is effectively abolished.
The Smith court may not have intended to establish a standard that must
be followed in all such cases, but rather, may have merely been holding that
this particular showing did qualify within the parameters of the more lenient
rule adopted in Morgan Express.31 Support for this position can be gained
from the curious fact that the court cited almost exclusively to cases that
have not required the appellant to seek a statement of facts from his
opponent or the trial judge. 32 Though the opinion is unclear in this respect, it
seems likely that the court, had it meant to sanction a rule more lenient than
26. 162 Tex. at 132-33, 345 S.W.2d at 711.
27. See, e.g., McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex. 1965); Lane Wood Indus., Inc.
v. DeMoss, 489 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, no writ).
28. The supreme court, quoting from its decision in Pace Sports, Inc. v. Davis Bros.
Publishing Co., 514 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1974), emphasized that a party appealing by writ of error
from a default judgment is not required to show that he was not negligent in suffering the
default or that he has a meritorious defense to his opponent's claims. He may obtain relief if the
invalidity of the judgment is disclosed by the papers on file in the case. 544 S.W.2d at 123.
29. 544 S.W.2d at 123.
30. d. at 122-23 (emphasis added).
31. 525 S.W.2d at 315, 316.
32. 544 S.W.2d at 123. In support of the defaulting party's right to a reversal and new trial
where he has, after due diligence and through no fault of his own, been deprived of a statement
of facts the court cited the following: Victory v. Hamilton, 127 Tex. 203, 91 S.W.2d 697 (1936);
Wallace v. Snyder Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Dugie v. Dugie, 511 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ); Fitz v.
Toungate, 419 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1%7, writ ref'd n.r.e.). All of these cases
held that the defaulting party is not required to seek an agreed or narrative statement of facts
where the claim was not liquidated and proved by an instrument in writing.
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that called for by the facts of Smith, would have explained that its decision
was not meant to establish the baseline for an adequate demonstration of
appellant's due diligence and genuine inability to obtain a statement of facts.
Thus, one may infer that the court intended its decision to establish an
affirmative guideline for the showing necessary to obtain a reversal and a
new trial in these default judgment cases.
From several subsequent courts of civil appeal decisions attempting to
interpret Smith, it is apparent that the confusion which has long plagued this
area of the law still exists. The courts in Rogers v. Rogers33 and Shepard v.
Shepard3' both have expressed the belief that the Smith ruling does not
establish the requisite showing of inability that must be made by the default
victim seeking a new trial. 35 These courts refused to follow Smith, however,
because they felt that the decision was based on the original version of
article 2324, which imposed a duty on the trial court to insure the court
reporter's presence.3 6 Because the statute was subsequently amended to
delete the mandatory language, the Shepard and Rogers courts held that
Smith is no longer relevant. 7
The timing of the Smith case would have called for a decision under the
original version of the statute as opposed to the amended, non-mandatory
version, 38 had the decision been based on article 2324. The supreme court,
however, made no mention of the statute; rather, it focused on the right of
the defendant to a proper appellate review instead of on the duty of the court
reporter to record the evidence as directed by the statute.39 Therefore,
Smith was not dependent on the provisions of article 2324.
Further support for this conclusion is provided by the supreme court's
recent adoption of rule 376(b), which became effective January 1, 1978.10
This rule defines the duties of the official court reporter in a manner similar
to that of article 2324."' The court was presented the opportunity to reestablish the mandatory duty of the court reporter to be present at all
proceedings,4 2 but declined to do so. Instead, the court adopted a nonmandatory version quite similar to that of the present wording of the amended article 2324.13 It seems likely that the court would have altered the effect
of amended article 2324 if it considered that statute hostile to the principle
adopted in Smith.
The Eastland court of civil appeals may be closer to a correct interpreta33. 549 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ pending).
34. 546 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
35. 549 S.W.2d at 473; 546 S.W.2d at 889.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Rogers v. Rogers, 549 S.W.2d at 473.
39. 544 S.W.2d at 123.
40. TEX. R. Civ. P. 376(b).
41. Id. at 715.
42. The original text of the proposed new rule as submitted in committee provided that the
duties of the court reporter would be performed under supervision of the trial judge and would
include attending all sessions of the court unless the recording of a proceeding be waived by all
parties in writing and with the consent of the judge. Id.
43. The adopted version of the rule retains permissive language similar to that of article
2324, providing that the duties of the court reporter "shall include ... attending all sessions of
court and making a full record of the evidence when requested to do so by the judge or any party
to a case . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
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tion of Smith. That court's recent opinion in Baen-Bec, Inc. v. Tenhoopen"
read Smith as requiring the appellant to seek a narrative fact statement in
order to show due diligence and thus preserve his right to appellate review.45

III. CONCLUSION
The extent of a defaulting party's right to have a question and answer
statement of facts for use on appeal when no court reporter was present at
the trial has been the subject of much litigation. Prior to Smith the courts of
civil appeals have split along two basic lines of thought. One view required
that before a new trial could be granted, the defaulting party must show an
unsuccessful attempt to obtain a narrative statement of facts from the trial
judge. The opposing line of cases pointed to the basic unfairness of that
requirement and held that the appellant need only demonstrate that there
was no question and answer statement available from the official court
reporter. The Texas Supreme Court, in Smith v. Smith, appears to have
adopted the former view. The court's recent adoption of rule 376(b), which
defines the duties of the court reporter in terms similar to those of the
amended article 2324, confirms the court's intent to require a default victim
to seek a statement of facts from the trial judge in cases where the court
reporter has not recorded the proceedings. Although this rule ignores possible abuse by a trial judge who has already decided the case against the
defendant and may, therefore, be incapable of providing an unbiased narrative statement of facts, the court has apparently sanctioned it for the
foreseeable future.*
Raymond D. Smith

44. 548 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no writ).
45. Id. at 801.
* Editor's Note: That foreseeable future has turned out to be rather short. After this Note
went to press the Texas Supreme Court rendered its decision in Rogers v. Rogers. For a
discussion of the court of civil appeals decision in Rogers see note 33 supra and accompanying
text. The supreme court reaffirmed the holding in Morgan Express that a defaulted party is not
required to seek an agreed statement of facts from the trial judge in order to satisfy the Victory
requirement of due diligence. Thus, the court has returned to the better reasoned rule which
places the burden of securing a court reporter on the parties who are actually present at trial.
Rogers v. Rogers, 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 131 (Jan. 4, 1978).

